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ABSTRACT 
There are a number of routing protocols developed by 
researchers. Due to the nature of ad hoc networks, 
secure routing is an important area of research in 
developing secure routing protocols. Although 
researchers have proposed several secure routing 
protocols, their resistance towards various types of 
security attacks and efficiency are primary points of 
concern in implementing these protocols. This paper 
presents some of the available secure routing protocols 
and most common attack patterns against ad hoc 
networks. Routing protocols are subjected to case 
studies against the most commonly identified attack 
patterns such as: denial-of-service attack, tunneling, 
spoofing, black hole attack and wormhole attack etc. In 
MANET, the nodes also function as routers that 
discover and maintain routes to other nodes in the 
network. Establishing an optimal and efficient route 
between the communicating parties is the primary 
concern of the routing protocols of MANET. Any 
attack in routing phase may disrupt the overall 
communication and the entire network can be 
paralyzed. Thus, security in network layer plays an 
important role in the security of the whole network. A 
number of attacks in network layer have been identified 
and studied in security research. An attacker can absorb 
network traffic, inject themselves into the path between 
the source and destination and thus control the network 
traffic flow. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 The latest advancement in wireless technology and its 
applications received a lot of attention. An ad hoc 
network is one such recent technology, which gives a 
new paradigm for wireless self-organized networks. Ad 
hoc networks are simple peer-to-peer networks, self-
organized and with no fixed infrastructure. They are 
used in military oriented tactical operations, for 
emergency law enforcement, and in rescue missions. 
Confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation 
and authentication are the basic requirements of 
information security [2]. Ad hoc network’s dynamic 
topology with no centralized administration makes it 
highly vulnerable for its security-breach, particularly 
secure routing in ad hoc networks has been a 
challenging task for researchers. Currently researchers 
are proposing a variety of secure routing protocols to 
meet their specified security requirements. In these 
proposals, different secure protocols fulfill different 
security requirements and counter against certain attack 
patterns. Researchers evaluate these protocols in 
context to how resistant these are, to security attacks 
and performance appraisal is done through simulation.\ 
 
1.1 Review of Routing Protocol   
In MANETs, some form of routing protocol is required 
in order to dynamically detect the multi-hop paths 
through which packets can be sent from one node to 
another [1]. There are basically two categories of 
routing protocols for MANETs: 
1. Table Driven (Proactive): DSDV, GSR, WRP 
2. Source Initiated On-Demand (Reactive): ABR, 
AODV, DSR, LAR 
Much of the research has been done focusing on the 
efficiency of the MANETs. There are quite a number of 
routing protocols that are excellent in terms of 
efficiency. But the security requirements of these 
protocols changed the situation and a more detailed 
research is currently underway to develop secure ad hoc 
routing protocols. MANETs are extremely vulnerable to 
attacks due to their dynamically changing topology, 
absence of conventional security infrastructures and 
open medium of communication, which, unlike their 
wired counterparts, cannot be secured. To address these 
concerns, several secure routing protocols have been 
proposed: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing 
(SEAD), Ariadne, and Authenticated Routing for Ad 
hoc Networks (ARAN), Secure Ad hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector Routing (SAODV), and Secure 
Routing Protocol (SRP).  Although researchers have 
proposed several secure routing protocols, their 
resistance towards various types of security attacks and 
efficiency are primary point of concern in implementing 
these protocols. Hence, there is a need for review. 
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1.2 SECURITY ATTACKS 
Mobile ad hoc network can be subject to many types of 
attacks. In Mobile ad hoc network, attacks can be 
classified into 
Passive Attacks and Active Attacks. Brief introduction 
of both attacks are as follow: 
A.  Passive Attacks 
In passive attacks, attackers don’t disrupt the operation 
of routing protocol but only attempt to discover 
valuable information by listening to the routing traffic 
[11]. The attacker only looks and watches the 
transmission and does not try to modify or change the 
data packets. Two types of passive attacks are: 
 
1.   Traffic analysis 
In this attack, attacker monitors packet transmission to 
infer important information such as a source, 
destination and source-destination pair. 
2.  Eavesdropping 
In Eavesdropping, attackers obtain some confidential 
information e.g. private key, public key, location or 
even password of the node that should be kept secret 
during transmission. 
 
B.  Active Attacks 
In the active attacks, the malicious nodes introduce 
false information to confuse the network topology. 
They can either attract traffic to them and then drop or 
compromise the packets. They can also send false 
information and lead packets to the wrong node and 
cause congestion in one area. The attacks can either 
target at the routing procedure or try to flood the 
networks. Various types of active attacks are: 
1.   Sinkhole Attack 
A sinkhole node tries to attract the data toward itself 
from all neighboring nodes. In this attack, a malicious 
node generates fake routing information and show itself 
as legal nodes for the route. Sinkhole node attempts to 
draw all network traffic according to itself, modifies the 
data packets, decrease the network life time, create 
complicated network and finally destroy the network. 
2.  Flooding Attack 
In this attack, a malicious node may also inject false 
packets to consume the available resources onto the 
network, so that valid user can not able to use the 
network resources for valid communication [8].The 
flooding attack is possible in all most all the on demand 
routing protocols such as SRP, SAODV, ARAN etc. 
3.  Replay 
This attack usually targets the freshness of routes. In 
this attack an attacker firstly record the message and 
then resend the old message to the other nodes to make 
update their routing table to stale routes. 
 
4.  Rushing Attack 
In Rushing attack, attacker forward routing packets as 
quick as possible to gain access to multicast forwarding 
group before the legal node .By this way rushing attack 
can slow down the performance of network .The 
rushing attack can act as an effective DoS attack against 
all currently proposed on demand MANET routing 
protocol[6][7]. 
C.   Common attacks in MANETs 
1.   Denial-of-service with modified source route 
In the denial-of-service, a malicious node in between 
can successfully send an erroneous route message to the 
source route to disrupt the service. 
2.  Tunneling Attack 
In tunneling attack is where two or more nodes may 
collaborate to encapsulate and exchange messages 
between them along existing data routes. 
3.  Wormhole Attack 
The goal is to have a 9-point text, as you see here. 
Please use sans-serif or non-proportional fonts only for 
special purposes, such as distinguishing source code 
text. If Times Roman is not available, try the font 
named Computer Modern Roman. On a Macintosh, use 
the font named Times.  Right margins should be 
justified, not ragged.  
In Wormhole an attacker records packet at one location 
in the network, tunnels them to another location, and 
retransmits 
them back into the network. This attack is possible even 
if the attacker has not compromised any hosts and even 
if all communication provides authenticity and 
confidentiality 
4.  Black hole Attack 
In Black hole attack a malicious node uses the routing 
protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to 
the node whose packets it wants to intercept and in this 
way it can compromise the service[4][5]. 
5.  Spoofing Attack 
In Spoofing a single malicious node in the ad hoc 
network can spoof the nodes identity in order to 
forward packets through it. Later the information can be 
used to create DoS attacks. 
 
2. CASE STUDIES OF ATTACK PATTERNS ON 
ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
2.1   Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) 
SEAD was developed based on Destination Sequence 
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Distance Vector (DSDV) and incorporates One-Way 
Hash function [9] to authenticate in the routing update 
mechanism in order to enhance the routing security. 
Securing a table driven protocol is harder than 
securing an on demand protocol due to the existence 
of predefined routes. Distance vector protocols 
encapsulate the route information into a hop count 
value and a next hop. An attacker cannot create a valid 
route with a larger sequence number that it received 
due to the properties of hash function. As SEAD 
incorporates neighbor authentication through Hash 
functions, an attacker cannot compromise any node. 
SEAD is prone through wormhole attack. Even if 
authentication is provided using hash functions, a 
wormhole attack is possible through tunneling the 
packets from one location and retransmitting them 
from other location into the network. All packets in 
the wormhole attack flow in a circle around instead of 
reaching the destination. 
Routing table overflow attacks are possible in SEAD, 
as SEAD is developed based on a table driven 
approach. A compromised node can advertise routes to 
nodes which are not in the network and there by fill in 
the space allocated in the routing table with false node 
routes. Spoofing attack is possible through 
compromised node acting like a destination node in 
the route discovery process by spoofing the identity 
of the destination node that can cause route 
destruction. Black hole attack is also possible through 
a compromised node advertising the shortest roots to 
non-existing nodes in the network. Tunneling and 
DOS attacks are also possible through compromised 
nodes. Table driven protocols are much more prone to 
security threats. 
 
2.2 Ariadne 
Ariadne was developed based on an on demand 
protocol, Destination Source Routing (DSR). Ariadne 
uses MACs and shared keys between nodes to 
authenticate between nodes and use time stamps for 
packet lifetime [10]. Wormhole attacks are possible 
in Ariadne through two compromised nodes. Ariadne 
prevents spoofing attacks with time stamps. The use 
of source routes prevents loops, since a packet passing 
through only legitimate nodes will not be forwarded 
into a loop due to time stamps. 
2.3 Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Network 
(ARAN) 
ARAN uses public key cryptography and a central 
certification authority server for node authentication 
and neighbor node authentication in route discovery. 
Denial-of-service attacks are possible with 
compromised nodes. Malicious nodes cannot initiate 
an attack due to the neighbor node authentication 
through certificates. Participating nodes broadcast 
unnecessary route requests across the network. An 
attacker can cause congestion in the network, there by 
compromising the functionality of the network. 
Spoofing attacks are prevented by ARAN through 
node level signatures. Each packet in the network is 
signed by its private key before broadcasted to the 
next level and checked for the authentication. So 
spoofing the identity of node is hampered by ARAN. 
Due to the strong cryptographic features of ARAN, 
malicious nodes cannot participate in any type of 
attack patterns. Only compromised nodes can 
participate in any attack pattern. Tunneling attacks are 
possible in ARAN. Two compromised neighbor nodes 
can collaborate to falsely represent the length of 
available paths by encapsulating and tunneling the 
routing message between them. Wormhole attack is 
also possible through two compromised nodes. Table 
overflow, black hole attacks are impossible due to 
node level authentication with signatures 
 
2.4 Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
Routing (SAODV) 
 
SAODV is a widely implemented protocol in industry 
due to its strong security features. SADOV uses a 
central key management in its routing topology. 
Digital signatures are used to authenticate at node level 
and hash chain is used to prevent the altering of node 
counts [12]. Tunneling attacks are possible through 
two compromised nodes. Wormhole attacks are always 
possible with compromised nodes in any ad hoc 
network topology. The use of sequence numbers could 
prevent most of the possible replay attacks 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discusses common possible attacks on 
different protocols being used in MANETs. We have 
tried to analyze them so as to prevent the attacker to 
intrude in wireless networks. There are lots of 
techniques with which, one can easily detect most of the 
attacks. One can choose them in accordance with the 
protocol being used in the network. However, no 
protocol is fully secure from attacks being encountered 
in the MANETs. Hence, one must choose a 
combination of techniques intelligently to avoid any 
attack and make the network fully secure. 
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